Publications

Livernois, Rebecca. 2018. “Regretful Decisions and Climate Change.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48, 2: 168-191 

Abstract: Climate change has made pressing the question of why we do little to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By analogy to the puzzle of the self-torturer, I argue that even if interpersonal and intergenerational conflicts of interest were resolved, we may still end up in a regretful environmental state when we aim to maximize our net benefit derived from polluting activities. This is because a rational agent with transitive preferences making climate change decisions faces incentives to over-pollute. This is caused by the presence of marginal costs that are uninformative of well-being in an uncertain and intertemporal decision problem.

Works in Progress: 

• Under review: A paper on the policy relevance of externalities (title withheld for blind review)
• A paper on the ethics of green nudges, with C. Tyler DesRoches, Daniel Fischer, Julia Silver, Phil Arthur, Gil Hersch, and Michiru Nagatsu
• A paper on environmental preferences, well-being, and measures of willingness to pay
• A paper on the controversy over the contingent valuation method in contemporary economic debates 

Dissertation

Livernois, Rebecca. 2019. A Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of an Externality in Economic Theory and Policy. Electronic Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 2008+. T, University of British Columbia. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0380447.

Abstract: Economists generally define an externality as an unpriced spillover effect. The paradigmatic case is pollution because it is unpriced and because it affects individuals who are not involved in the choices that lead to its production. One solution to an externality is to set a tax, called a Pigovian tax, on the unpriced activity at the value of the externality in equilibrium. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, the standard Pigovian policy is to impose a carbon tax. This policy response depends, however, on the way an externality is defined, yet there is a notable lack of consensus among economists on a precise definition of this concept. In my dissertation, I develop an account of the concept of an externality that is based on the way it is modelled in contemporary microeconomics. I argue that there are two plausible interpretations of an externality that are consistent with this account, both of which are problematic. It is therefore unclear whether this concept could be instantiated in any concrete sense. Consequently, I suggest that policies that aim to internalize an externality cannot be fully justified. Furthermore, I argue that the solution to the problem of climate change is not exhausted by the containment of externalities, as some economists suggest. Even if all externalities were resolved, there might still be an incentive to pollute beyond the socially optimal level. This is due to the peculiar cost structure of climate change in which the marginal costs of polluting are uninformative of the total costs.